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JOINT VENTURES IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of a unified European economic market has prompted a
revision of the regulations which the European Community Commission'
will utilize in policing joint ventures in the European Community ("EC").2
1. The EC Commission is a decision making and regulatory body presiding over the
entire EC. It is the key institution in the system and in fact bears major responsibility for
the formulation and enforcement of the general economic policy of the EC. MARio M.
MENDEs, ANTIrRUST IN A WORLD OF INTERRELATED ECONOMIES 243 (1991). Its strength
and influence may be demonstrated through the observation that the member states have
displayed little resistance to the directives issued by the Commission's Council of
Ministers, and it enjoys great influence over internal legislation of the member states.
Mario S. Massel, Legal-Economic Trends in the Common Market, in ABA, CURRENT
LEGAL ASPECrS oF DoiNg BusiNEss iN THE EEC 231, 240 (Mark R. Joelson et al. eds.,
1978). The Commission is also a watch dog with respect to anti-competitive behavior
within the EC. JAMES P. CUNNINGHAM, THE COMPETITION LAw OF THE EEC 39 (Supp.
to Sept. 13, 1975).
2. In 1951, the six continental industrial countries (France, Italy, West Germany,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), led by the French, set up the European Coal
and Steel Community in order to pool their coal and steel resources. See TREATY
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY [ECSC TREATY], Apr. 18,
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140. The success of this endeavor led to the establishment of the
European Economic Community ("EEC"), or the Common Market, which has three goals:
(1) the elimination of all internal tariff barriers; (2) the development of a common tariff
system with respect to the outside world; and (3) the free movement of labor and capital
within the Common Market. R.R. PALMER & JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN
WORLD 847-48 (1978). In 1973, after years of French protest, Great Britain finally became
a member of the EEC, as did Denmark and Ireland. Id (This brought the number of
member states to nine.); see generally ROBERT MOWAT, CREATINo THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY (1973) (discussing postwar European economic cooperation and the movement
toward unification); R. ALBRECHT-CARRME, ONE EUROPE; THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
OF EUROPEAN UNITY (1965) (an exploration of the historical background to unification);
W. HENDERSON, THE GENESIS OF THE COMMON MARKET (1963) (study of Western
European economics in the postwar era).
The EEC's implementing document was the Treaty between Belgium, the Federal
Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands establishing the
European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, [hereinafter Treaty of
Rome], reprinted in J. A. S. GRENviLLE & BERNARD WASSERSTEiN, THE MAJOR
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES SINCE 1945 at 223 (1987). Thereafter, amendments were
suggested to clear up the Treaty's stance on joint ventures. Id. None of the amendments,
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This emendation has resulted in the Commission's directive, Regulation on
the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings ("Regulation"), which
emerged in December 1989, and took effect on September 21, 1990.3 The
Regulation will likely influence the way in which joint ventures are dealt
with in the EC.4 More importantly, the new Regulation has spawned a
Commission Notice ("Notice"), which attempts to spell out a working
definition of "joint venture."5 Through an examination of the Regulation
however, were formally adopted. William Elland, The Mergers Control Regulation (EEC)
No. 4064/89, 11 ECLR 111 (1990). The most noteworthy effort was the Principles
Governing the Assessment of Joint Ventures Under the Competition Rules (Proposed),
Comm. Doc. IV/471/85-EN [hereinafter Proposed Principles], reprinted in Ivo VAN BAFL
& JEAN-FRANCOIs BELLIS, COMPETMON LAW OF THE EEC 542-47 annex 23 (1987).
Another amendment was the Proposal for a Regulation (EEC) of the Council on the
Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings of 20 July 1973, 1973 O.J. (C 92) 1.
The EC adopted a grand plan for unifying the economies of its twelve member states
in CONMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Completing the International Market:
Commission White Paper to the European Council, COM(85)310 final. The scheme aims
to eliminate customs and trade barriers by December 31, 1992. Although the 1992
program is far more grandiose than the three other treaties that created the EC, the Treaty
of Rome, supra, the ECSC Treaty, supra, and the TREATY ESTABLSHING THE EUROPEAN
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY [EURATOM TREATY], March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167,
it will have the same result that these other documents had earlier foreseen, creating a
fulcrum of authority in Brussels and Belgium. See also Anthony L. Gardner, Forewar4
Harmonization in the European Community, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 1 (1991);
T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN CoMMuNrrY LAw 3 (1981); John
Ardagh, Will the New Europe Please Sit Down, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1991, § 6
(Magazine), at 42; Thomas H. Irwin, The New Europe: An Economic Giant is Born,
A.B.A. J., JAN. 1992, at 58.
3. Council Regulation 4064189 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentration
Between Undertakings, 1989 OJ. (L 395) 1 [hereinafter Regulation]. The regulation was
considered epic. Sir Leon Brittan, a member of the Council of Ministers, was driven to
say: "Today we have made a historic breakthrough into the creation of a single European
Market. The Community can be proud of reaching agreement on an issue of such
complexity and importance after many years of negotiations." Press Release IP (89) 1007,
quoted in Elland, supra note 2, at 111; see generally Sir Leon Brittan, The Law and Policy
of Merger Control in the EEC, 15 EUR. L. REV. 351 (1990); See also Frank L. Fine, EC
Merger Control: An Analysis of the New Regulation, 11 ECLR 47, 47 (1990).
4. Article 3(2), paragraph 1 excludes joint ventures, but the second paragraph of that
provision provides: "The creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the
functions of an autonomous economic entity, which does not give rise to coordination of
the competitive behaviour of the parties amongst themselves or between them and the joint
venture, shall constitute a concentration ... ." Regulation, supra note 3, art. 3(2), at 4.
Thus, permanent joint ventures would be covered by article 3, paragraph 2, provided they
fulfilled the qualifying criteria for concentrations under the Regulation. See Elland, supra
note 2, at 112.
5. Commission Notice Regarding the Concentrative and Cooperative Operations Under
JOINT VENTURES IN EC
and the Notice, this note speculates upon the future of joint ventures in the
EC.
Joint ventures can contribute to the Community's general economic
objectives in numerous ways: specifically, through the facilitation of risky
investments; the promotion of innovation and the transfer of technology;
the development of new markets; the improvement of the competitiveness
of Community industry; and the strengthening of the competitive position
of small- and medium-size firms.6 Joint ventures, however, may also have
anti-competitive effects that are at odds with the EC's general economic
objectives. For example, they may induce market sharing, raise barriers to
entry, and intensify market power.7 These are considered negative
economic effects."
Anti-competitive aspects of the joint venture are the focus of the
Commission's concerns. Although such arrangements have many benefits,
market manipulation and dominance are problems the Community seeks to
avoid. In light of these policy concerns, this note considers both the new
Council Regulation No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Council of Concentrations
Between Undertakings, 1990 O.J. (C 203) 10 [hereinafter Commission Notice].
6. Proposed Principles, supra note 2, at 542. See generally Valentine Korah, Critical
Comments on the Commission's Recent Decisions Exempting Joint Ventures to Exploit
Research that Needs Further Development, 12 EUR. L. REv. 18 (1987) (dealing with
investment in innovation, via research and development, through the joint venture scheme);
JAMES DOBKIN, ET AL., INTRATIONAL JOINT VENTUREs 2-1 to 2-17 (1986) (relating
general principles concerning the positive aspects of the joint venture); Joseph F. Brodley,
Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1529 (1982) (asserting that
joint ventures serve important transactional needs for which there may be no equally
efficient contractual alternative); M. R. Mok, The Jointly Owned Subsidiary ("Joint
Venture") and Article 85 of the EEC-Treaty, in EUROPEAN COMPEITION POLICY 120
(Europa Institute of the University of Leiden ed., 1973) (analyzing the relationship between
joint ventures and their parent corporations); Jules Backman, Joint Ventures and the
Antitrust Laws, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 652 (1965) (provides a general overview of antitrust
concerns).
7. Proposed Principles, supra note 2, at 542. See generally DOBKIN Elr AL., supra note
6 (speaking about general anti-trust principles as they relate to the joint venture); Brodley,
supra note 6, at 1530-33 (discussing the anti-competitive risks of the joint venture,
specifically collusion, loss of potential competition, market exclusion, and access
discrimination).
8. Market sharing, raising barriers to entry, and the centralization of market power all
result from the concentration of market forces within a union of two former competitors.
The view that there is a relationship between concentration and efficiency, in which the
former hinders the latter, has been espoused by many economists. DANIEL F. SPULBER,
REGULATION AND MARKETS 500 (1989). See generally Edward S. Mason, The Current
State of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1265-85
(1949).
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Regulation and Notice concerning joint ventures, for it was these issues
that helped the Commission formulate its revised policy.'
An evaluation of the nature of the joint venture, past regulatory policy,
and the new directives will make a noticeable shift evident. Preserving
competition in the EC market is now a priority. The Commission will
likely support new ventures which are devoid of anti-competitive risks that
might result in market dominance by co-venturers over their particular
industry.10  Anti-competitive joint-ventures, however, may actually
produce some positive economic benefits, provided that the entities at issue
remain independent of each other.
I1 THE JOINT VENTURE
A. Form
A joint venture exists when two or more independent parent corpora-
tions organize a corporation for the purpose of carrying out a specific
ancillary activity on the parent corporation's behalf." It is not merely a
contractual undertaking by two or more parties to corroborate on and
perform a specific task or one-time project ("contractual joint venture").
2
Nor is it merely a contractual arrangement by two or more parties to
cooperate in the pursuit of the contract by dividing the prescribed tasks in
accordance with the respective qualifications of the parties ("consortium"
or "teaming arrangement"). 3 A joint venture is also not a mere patent
or technology agreement calling for the conveyance of rights and the
physical transfer of technology.
14
9. The policy concerns that will be the focus of this note are the ones that deal with the
balancing of a joint venture's positive economic characteristics as against its possible
negative anti-competitive effects.
10. Seminar on Single European Market Probes EC Commissions Merger Program, 56
ANTITRUST & TRADE REa. REP. (BNA) No. 1406, at 383 (Mar. 9, 1989). Under the
Regulation, the Commission is expected to allow enterprises to achieve the size they need
to compete in global markets. Id. Roger Daout of the Commission's Directorate General
IV (DG IV) insisted that the "[economic and social objectives of the Treaty of Rome
would not be forgotten." Id. He also mentioned that "[aluthorization could be given for
operations that theoretically should be banned on the grounds of production planning,
employment safeguards, and balanced regional development." Id.
11. DOBKIN ur AL., supra note 6, at 2-2.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See generally Korah, supra note 6, at 19 (taking the position that, to his regret, the
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A joint venture often contains some or all of the foregoing contractual
elements, but it must also possess one more essential characteristic: the
embodiment of a separate legal entity jointly owned and managed by the
parent companies. 5 A joint venture must be a separate identifiable entity,
with an ownership interest in such entity by each joint venturer, and an
active management involvement or deliberate abdication of the right to
such involvement by each joint venture partner.
6
Joint ventures may have a number of objectives: common production,
distribution, research, purchase, profit and loss sharing, patent pools, and
technical acumen."7 The motives behind the formation of a joint venture
may include raising of capital; spreading of risks; developing new sources
of raw materials; combining the availability of raw materials with
knowledge of how to convert them into finished products; obtaining
economies of scale in production and marketing; making use of compli-
mentary or overlapping techniques including both production and sales
techniques; and restricting competition."8 Joint ventures that result in a
restriction upon competition, however, are considered problematic. 9 The
anti-competitive nature of some joint ventures has led to the Commission's
new Regulation, and the Community's attempt to formulate a coherent joint
venture policy.20 In this context, there must be a balancing between valid
and important objectives, and improper motives.2'
Commission has frequently exempted joint ventures for research and development rather
than finding that they do not infringe upon Article 85 (1)); Jonathan Faull, Joint Ventures
Under the EEC Competition Rules, 5 ECLR 358 (1986) (positing that if a joint venture
creates something for which there are no substitutes, the new product creates competitive
pressures); VALENTINE KORAH, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT JOINT VENTURES AND THE
EEC COMPETIToN RUES (1986) (asserting that joint ventures for the further growht in
research and development require favorable antitrust treatment); James S. Venit, The
Research and Development Block Exemption Regulation, 10 EUR. L. REV. 151 (1985)
(noting that to require compulsory licenses under the competition rules would enable others
to take a cheap ride on the enterprise thereby reducing the incentives for innovation); ERIC
WHrIE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT JOINT VENTURES UNDER EEC COMPETITION LAW
(1985) (recognizing that the commission has created a block exemption for a limited class
of research and development joint ventures).
15. DOBKIN ET AL, supra note 6, at 2-2; see also VAN BAEL & BELLUS, supra note 2,
at 182; Brodley, supra note 6, at 1525; Mok, supra note 6, at 120-22.
16. DOBKIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 2-2.
17. Mok, supra note 6, at 122; Proposed Principles, supra note 2, at 542.
18. Mok, supra note 6, at 122.
19. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
20. Commission Notice, supra note 5, at 10.
21. See generally VAN BAEL & BELUS, supra note 2, at 182 (referring to the Proposed
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B. Varying Interpretive Analyses of Joint Ventures
A simple definition of the joint venture is "basically a company in
which the bulk, if not all, of the stock is owned by two or more parent
companies."' The Commission, in its Principles Governing the Assess-
ment of Joint Ventures under the Competition Rules (proposed), has
defined joint ventures as "undertakings jointly controlled by two or more
economically independent firms." 23  Commentators have noted the
vagueness of such broad definitions, leading one such observer to comment
that "'joint venture,' as the term has been used in the antitrust field, is a
vague and protean concept, which, at the extreme, might be taken to
include all situations in which two or more persons or independent firms
join forces to achieve some common goal." 2'
Because some of these ventures lead to anti-competitive behavior,'
definitions that account for this possibility are more useful than those that
simply point out the term's sweeping character. For example, construing
a joint venture as "an expansive notion without definite meaning or
antitrust consequence," while noting that it involves a situation in which
"several persons join forces to achieve a joint 'legitimate' objective which
may have anti-competitive implications" is more helpful.26 Characterized
this way, the dichotomy between permissive or desirable objectives and
impermissible or undesirable motives is made plain. Thus, there is not
only a static definitional term, but a policy grounding, which expounds the
Principles' clarification of the market share threshold for the application of Article 85(1));
N. T. Wang, Analysis of Restrictive Business Practices by Transnational Corporations and
Their Impact on Trade and Development, in COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL BusINEsS
3 (Oscar Schachter & R. Hellawell eds., 1981) (claiming that the "attention focused on
restrictive business practices is a necessary counterpart of the general concern about the
pervasive effect of transnational corporations"); Brodley, supra note 6, at 1525 (Brodley
posits that "[lloint ventures also merit distinctive antitrust treatment because of the special
nature of the anti-competitive risks they create."); Mok, supra note 6, at 139 (asserting that
"[w]hat counts in fact is to prevent joint ventures [from] becoming an alternative way to
restrict competition, a means of escape because genuine cartels are prohibited.").
22. Stanley E. Boyle, The Joint Subsidiary: An Economic Appraisal, 5 ANTITRUST
BULL. 303 n.2 (1960).
23. Proposed Principles, supra note 2, at 542.
24. Robert Pitifsky, Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1007
(1969).
25. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
26. PHa.LP P. AREEA, ANTITRUST ANALYsis 275 (1967).
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need for regulation to guard against permissive objectives being carried out
in furtherance of an impermissive anti-competitive motive.27
A further definition espoused by one expert sets out the important
characteristics of the joint venture. The definition allows room for
regulation because it identifies the problem areas where anti-competitive
activity may arise. It states that a joint venture is
an integration of operations between two or more separate firms,
in which the following conditions are present: (1) the enterprise
is under the joint control of the parent firms; (2) each parent
makes a substantial contribution to the joint enterprise; (3) the
enterprise exists as a business entity separate from its parents; and
(4) the joint venture creates significantly new enterprise capability
in terms of new productive capacity, new technology, a new
product, or entry into a new market.'
This definition also spells out desirable objectives and identifies an area of
anti-competitive risk.
The Commission attempts to confront these issues in its new
Regulation. The main distinction appears to be between those joint
ventures that are cooperative and those which appear to be concentra-
tive.29 This difference will serve as the point of departure for analysis of
the Commission's new directives.
III. REGULATION
A. Joint Ventures in the EC Under the Treaty of Rome
Joint ventures were previously defined in loose terms as "undertakings
jointly controlled by two or more economically independent firms," 3' and
assessed under articles 85 or 86 of the Treaty of Rome .3  The Commis-
sion required undertakings to file a notice and secure an exemption from
27. Id.
28. Brodley, supra note 6, at 1526.
29. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 3(2), at 4. The first paragraph under subsection 2
reads: "An operation, including the creation of a joint venture, which has as its object or
effect the coordination of the competitive behavior of undertakings which remain
independent shall not constitute a concentration ... ." id. (emphasis added).
30. VAN BAEL & BELUS, supra note 2, at 182.
31. Id.; EEC, MERGER CONTROL IN THE EEC 225 (1988); VALEmIE KoRAH, EEC
COMPEITION LAW AND PRACTICE 111-13 (1986).
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article 85(1) pursuant to article 85(3) of the Treaty of Rome, before
commencement of an implementation phase. 32 This decision-maldng
process by the Commission involves weighing the joint venture's economic
benefits against any anti-competitive effects." The commission essential-
ly has been disposed to grant such exemptions when an arrangement
promotes technological progress within the Community and contributes to
the goal of an integrated European market.3'
Article 85(1) prohibits all agreements that have as their objective the
prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the EC.35
Article 85(3) provides that an agreement precluded by the article 85(1)
prohibition may be exempted by the Commission if the agreement has
positive implications that outweigh its negative effects. 6
Four criteria must be satisfied in order to obtain a positive response
from the Commission. The joint venture must: (1) contribute to improv-
32. Article 85(1) reads:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market:
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings
and concerted practices may affect trade between member states and which have
as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or
investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply ....
Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, at 229.
33. VAN BAEr. & BELL s, supra note 2, at 182.
34. Id.; see also Todd B. Overton, Comment, Substantive Distinctions Between United
States Antitrust Law and the Competition Policy of the European Community: A
Comparative Analysis of Divergent Policies, 13 HoUs. J. INT'L L. 315, 322-23 (1991).
Andreas Weitbrecht, an attorney specializing in EC antitrust law, during a discussion
regarding joint venture analysis under the Treaty of Rome, lamented that: "[t]he
Commission in more than 20 years of applying Article 85 to joint ventures has not
developed a cohesive intellectual framework for applying Article 85 to joint ventures."
However, "this is not to say that the right decisions have not been reached." The analysis
of joint ventures under article 85 is similiar to the article 85 analysis applied in other areas
of EC antitrust law. "An extremely wide scope" has been given to subsection (1); and
joint ventures "easily fulfill" its requirements since "almost anything will be found to have
an effect on competition." There has been an equally generous grant, however, of
exemptions under article 95(3). ABA Section Probes Development in EC Competition Law
and Policy, 60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1522, at 910 (June 27, 1991)
[hereinafter ABA Section Probes Developments].
35. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, at 229.
36. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CoMMuNITY, COMPANY GUIDE 979 (1990) [hereinafter EEC].
[Vol. 13322
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ing the production or distribution of goods, or promote technical or
economic progress; (2) pass on to consumers a fair share of the resulting
benefits; (3) limit restrictions to those indispensable for the achievement
of these objectives; and (4) not eliminate competition for a substantial part
of the products in question.37 These requirements exhibit the concerns
over positive economic benefits versus market dominance and negative
anti-competitive behavior; the former must be great, while the latter is
required to be negligible.3' However, even when the possibility of anti-
competitive behavior seems likely, it may still be possible to obtain an
individual exemption, especially when there are competing centers of
innovation outside the common market.39 It is more difficult to establish
an infringement under article 86. This article requires the abuse of a
dominant position.'" A joint venture will only be considered a concentra-
tion if the parent companies transfer all of their assets to the joint venture
and in reality become no more than holding companies, thereby losing their
economic independence. 4' In this way, the joint venture structure may be
37. Id.
38. See VAN BAEL & BELu-S, supra note 2, at 187 (suggesting that restrictions of
competition that are of de minimus significance fall outside the scope of article 85(1));
Proposed Principles, supra note 2, at 543 ("the Commission takes the view that joint
ventures may fall within 85(1) only if parents' combined market share exceeds 5%.").
However, "[i]f the partners combined market share does not exceed 15%, it can normally
be assumed that the joint venture does not distort the competitive structure of the market."
Id. at 546.
39. See KoRAH, supra note 31, at 118.
40. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, at 229. Article 86 reads:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member
States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or
other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice
of consumers ....
Id.
With respect to article 86's prohibitions, one scholar has remarked that "community
law against abuse of dominant position regulates excessive pricing, proscribes acquisitions
that increase dominance, and forbids strategies that unnecessarily exclude competitors from
markets, deprive entrepreneurs of access to inputs and deprive buyers of freedom of
choice." Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the
European Community: Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
981, 1017 (1986).
41. VAN BAEL & BswS, supra note 2, at 183; Mok, supra note 6, at 135; Proposed
Principles, supra note 2, at 547.
1992] 323
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seen not as cooperative, but instead as concentrative.' It is possible to
obtain an exemption under article 86 if the parent companies completely
and irreversibly abandon business in the area covered by the joint venture;
the transfer of assets does not restrict competition in areas where the parent
companies are still competitors.'3 Most joint ventures are, however,
handled under article 85(1).44
Joint ventures are rarely treated as partial concentrations removed from
the scope of article 85. 5 To do so would leave the Commission with
article 86 as its only resort. Furthermore, to establish an abuse of market
position is far more difficult than positing a restriction upon competi-
tion.' A restriction of competition may be established under article 85(1)
when the partners in the joint venture are actual or potential competitors,
or when the partners in the joint venture are neither actual nor potential
competitors, but the joint venture arrangements affect the market position
of the third parties in the market, or other such related markets.'
Aside from the restriction of competition itself, another factor that
must be considered is the nature of the relationship between the parent
companies themselves. 4 A joint venture formed among actual competi-
tors may be found to restrict competition either directly or indirectly.'9
In research and development joint ventures, the Commission will presume
that the creation of the joint ventures between actual competitors restricts
competition by preventing each from gaining an advantage over the other,
resulting in a concentration."° Production joint ventures will generally be
42. The terms cooperative and concentrative will be developed and qualified later in
this note at section EI.B., which deals with joint ventures under the new Regulation and
Commission Notice.
43. See VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 2, at 183; Mok, supra note 6, at 135;
Proposed Principles, supra note 2, at 547.
44. Mok, supra note 6, at 135.
45. VAN BAEL & BFiS, supra note 2, at 184; Mok, supra note 6, at 136.
46. VAN BAEL & BELUS, supra note 2, at 184.
47. Id.; Proposed Principles, supra note 2, at 545.
48. See generally Brodley, supra note 6, at 1530-35 (identifying the anti-competitive
risks inherent in the context of joint ventures where the parent companies are either
competitors or potential competitors).
49. Proposed Principles, supra note 2, at 545 ("Where the parent companies are
competitors and the joint venture will operate on the same market, a restriction of
competition between the parents is likely, if not unavoidable.").
50. See, e.g., In re Henkel/Colgate, 1972 O.J. (L 14) 14, reprinted in LEADING CASES
AND MATERIALS ON THE COMPETITION LAw OF THE EEC 468 (D.J. Gijistra & D.F.
Murphy eds., 1984).
324 [Vol. 13
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deemed to restrict competition. On the supply side, the parties forego
the opportunity of manufacturing the products independently and offering
them on the market as competitors. 52 On the demand side, the consum-
er's range of choice is reduced through the joint venture.5 3 Distribution
Henkel and Colgate have decided to coordinate their development projects
concerning textile detergents. A research company set up in Switzerland and
in which they both have equal holdings, will synthesize the individual research
studies so far effected and will continue them to the point where they are
exploitable commercially. The results of the joint research (patents or know-
how) will be accessible to both partners in the same way and both may exploit
them without restriction. Each partner will be entitled to obtain, subject to a
payment of a due of two percent maximum, a license for all countries. The
importance of this decision is to be seen in the fact that joint research, decided
on between two firms of world scale on an oigopolistic market, is thus made
subject to the prohibition on combinations laid down in the Community.
Competition at the research level plays a special role in this market; the
improvement of the quality and method of use of the products which must
result from individual research is one of the principal means of conquering
shares in the market and improving one's position in relation to competing
finns.
Id; see also Beecham/Parke Davis, 1979 O.J. (L 70) 11.
51. See Rockwell/Iveco, 1983 0. J. (L 244) 19.
52. Id
53. See De Laval-Stork, 1977 OJ. (L 215) 11, reprinted in LEADING CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EEC 124-25 (D. Gijlstra & D. Murphy
eds., 1989). In this case the Commission took a favorable decision as to an agreement
between the American company DeLaval and the Dutch company Stork, which formed a
joint venture at Hengelo, Netherlands. The objective of the venture was to combine their
production and marketing activities for Europe and the Middle East. Id. Their cooperation
covers turbines and compressors used in large-scale plants such as refineries. Id
Under the agreement, Stork made part of its Hengelo manufacturing plant available
to the joint venture and DeLaval provided technical know-how, but DeLaval and Stork
remain independent manufacturers. d
Competition between Stork and DeLaval restricts competition in the Community's
turbine and compressor sector because the production and marketing activities of these two
competitors have been merged in to a single joint undertaking, thereby reducing European
customers' choices. Id The venture is therefore restricted by the prohibition in article
85(1). Id
The venture does, however, bring with it appreciable economic advantages such as
increased know-how and wider product range for Stork, as well as easier penetration of the
European market for DeLaval. This justifies exemption under Article 85(3). The various
agreements between the two companies do not lead to market dominance, and there are a
number of important suppliers in the market larger than DeLaval and Stork, whose own
combined market share is between ten and fifteen percent. id
The decision imposes conditions and obligations, which will ensure that the ability
of DeLaval and Stork to compete with the joint venture is not unnecessarily limited, that
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
joint ventures tend to deprive competitors of the possibility of pursuing
independent marketing and pricing policies.5'
When the parent companies are not actual competitors, the joint
venture may still restrict competition and fall within article 85(1)."5
Relevant issues in deciding whether or not to grant an exemption include:
(1) whether the investment expenditure involved exceeds the financing
capacity of each partner, (2) whether each partner is familiar with the
process technology; (3) whether it is feasible for each partner to manufac-
ture the products on its own; and (4) whether each partner might not be
able to bear the technical and financial risk alone.' If a number of these
considerations are resolved, it is likely that the Commission would grant
an exemption.
B. Joint Ventures in the EC Under the New Regulation
and the Commission Notice
1. The Directives
The Council of Ministers adopted the new merger control Regulation
on December 21, 1989. 57 The Regulation, which took effect on Septem-
ber 21, 1990, was considered a major step for the European Community."
the parent companies are able to make unrestricted use of jointly acquired know-how after
the joint venture comes to an end and that the cooperation does not lead to any further
restriction of competition in the turbine and compressor industries. Id; see also
VW/MAN, 1983 O.J. (L 376).
54. See Sopelemn/Vickers, 1987 O.J. (L 70) 47; VWIMAN, supra note 53, at 11.
55. VAN BAEL & BELls, supra note 2, at 185.
56. Id.; Proposed Principles, supra note 2, at 546. The Proposed Principles also note
that:
The crucial factor in determining the applicability of Article 85(1) to joint
ventures between potential competitors is whether, taking into account all
relevant economic circumstances, the partners could reasonably be expected to
enter the market individually. If individual market entry is unlikely in the
foreseeable future, the joint venture will not restrict existing competition but
will lead to the creation of new competition.
Id at 544.
57. Elland, supra note 2, at 111; Fine, supra note 3, at 47; EC Commission Approves
Notification Rules for Merger Regulation Effective Sept. 21, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
31, at 1196 (1990); Lucy Kellaway, Easier Line on EC Joint Ventures, FIN. TIMES, July
24, 1990, at 2; Ancillary Restrictions in Joint Venture Conform to Article 85 of Treaty of
Rome, 59 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1477, at 189 (1990) [hereinafter
Ancillary Restrictions].
58. See Elland, supra note 2, at I11; Fine, supra note 3, at 47; EC Commission
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The regulation was an uneasy compromise between two major positions."
The smaller member states were eager for the swift imposition of a tough,
low threshold regulation.' The countries with highly developed domestic
regulatory governance were reluctant to see their domestic control over
undertakings transferred to Brussels. 61 Ultimately, the new Regulation
passed, impinging upon the way in which joint ventures were overseen in
the EC.
On July 25, 1990, other guidelines were adopted that involved two
notices seeking to determine the distinction between mergers and joint
ventures, and to set out the Commission's viewpoint on anti-competitive
restrictions within such agreements.62 This is where the Commission's
definition of joint ventures and explanation of the cooperative and
concentrative distinction may be found.63
Technically, joint ventures are excluded from the application of the
Regulation because its focus is on mergers and acquisitions. Therefore,
they remain subject to articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome."
However, article 3(2), paragraph 1, provides that permanent joint ventures
that operate to concentrate economic power among the venture and its
parents, as opposed to coordinating such competitive behavior, will be
deemed as concentrations, subject to the Regulation.65 Herein lies the
Approves Notfication Rules for Merger Regulation Effective Sept. 21, supra note 57, at
1196; Kellaway, supra note 57, at 2; Ancillary Restrictions, supra note 57, at 189.
59. Elland, supra note 2, at 111.
60. Id
61. Id Brussels, the "capital" of the EC, is where the Commission presides. The
reason for the passage of the new Regulation becomes evident when one reads the
legislation's statement of purpose, which includes the following language: "Whereas
Articles 85 and 86, while applicable to case law of the Court of Justice, to certain
concentrations, are not, however, sufficient to cover all operations which may prove to be
incompatible with the system of undistorted competition envisaged in the treaty [of
Rome]." Regulation, supra note 3, at L 395/1.
62. Commission Notice, supra note 5; Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2367/90 of
July 1990 on the Notifications, Time Limits and Hearings Provided for in Council
Regulations (EEC) No. 4064189 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings,
1990 O.J. (L 219); EC Commission Approves Implementing Merger Rules, DAILY REPORT
POR ExEcuTIVES, July 26, 1990, at A3; EC Commission Approves Notification Rules, supra
note 57, at 1196; see Fine, EC Merger Control in the 1990's: An Overview of the Draft
Regulation, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 513, 515 (1989) (expresses the view that a clear
definition of the joint venture is needed, and indicates that the guidelines will conform to
the aim of enhancing the certainty of the environment in which firms must compete).
63. Commission Notice, supra note 5, at C 203/15.
64. Fine, supra note 3, at 48.
65. See supra text accompanying note 4; Paul D. Callister, Note, The December 1989
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importance of the Commission's new definitional terms. The way in which
a joint venture is characterized will dictate the treatment it receives. This
outcome has led at least one commentator to observe that "[u]nfortunately,
given the very general way concentrations are defined, and the grey area
which can arise between a joint venture which does not fall within the
Regulation and a partial merger/joint venture which does, extreme care
must be taken by the legal advisor in effecting an analysis of the acquisi-
tion. "66 The belief is that restrictions needed to set up joint ventures will
not infringe upon the Regulation, provided that the enterprise is not anti-
competitive (in the sense that it is cooperative in nature as opposed to
concentrative). 67
The Commission will allow any reasonable restrictions that are
necessary to set up and efficiently operate a joint venture." Such
restrictions will be considered compatible with the rules of competition.
9
Similar to the old system under the Treaty of Rome, desirable positive
economic benefits will be weighed against negative anti-competitive
behavior.7° The joint ventures that foster cooperation in competition
between the venture and its parents will be treated under articles 85 and 86
of the Treaty of Rome.7' If concentration of competition seems likely,
the joint venture will fall within the purview of the new Regulation, and
when competition between the joint venture and its parents ceases, a
concentration will arise. This type of arrangement is considered a
"concentrative joint venture," and will be dealt with under the new
Regulation.'
European Community Control Regulation: A Non-EC Perspective, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
1, 130 (1991).
66. Elland, supra note 2, at 113.
67. Ancillary Restrictions, supra note 57, at 189.
68. Id
69. Id
70. EEC, supra note 36, at 979.
71. Id
72. EC Commission Approves Notification Rules for Merger Regulation Effective Sept.
21, supra note 57, at 1196. The article quotes a senior official as saying:
If the operation creates an economic unit on a long-lasting basis, then it will
probably fall under the merger control regulation. If, however, its purpose is
to coordinate activity, then it lies in the joint venture category and would be
subject to the Commission's power to combat cartels or anti-competitive
agreements under Article 85 Treaty of Rome.
Id The senior official also gave an example of what he meant:
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2. "Cooperation" Versus "Concentration"
Under the new Regulation, concentrations are defined in article 3,
paragraph 1, which states:
1. A concentration shall be deemed to arise where:
(a) two or more previously independent undertakings merge,
or
(b) one or more persons already controlling at least one
undertaking, or one or more undertakings acquire, whether by
purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other
means, direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or
more other undertakings.
3
When a joint venture is created to perform on a lasting basis, and does
not have as its object the coordination of the competitive behavior between
the parent companies and the venture, it will be considered a concentration
within the meaning of paragraph 1(b). 74 Conversely, a joint venture that
has as its objective the coordination of the competitive behavior among the
independent parent companies will not be considered a concentration."
The term "cooperative joint venture" arises from this section.
The Commission Notice makes the explicit distinction between
concentrative and cooperative joint ventures, as well as how each will be
handled:
The Regulation in Article 3(2) refers to two types of joint
ventures: those which have as their object or effect the coordina-
tion of the competitive behavior of undertakings which remain
independent (referred to as "cooperative joint ventures") and those
The decision by two producers of the same product to set up a joint subsidiary
to distribute the product at a specific price would fall under Article 85 because
it eliminates competition from the market. However, the decision by two motor
car manufacturers to concentrate their gear box activities into a single company
that would provide gears to both manufacturers would fall under the merger
regulation.
73. Regulation, supra note 3, at L 395/4; see Philippe De Smedt & Georges
Vandersanden, The EC Merger Control Regulation, 13 HAsTINGs INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
437, 442 (1990).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 4, 29.
75. Id.
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which perform on a lasting basis all the functions of an autono-
mous economic entity and which do not give rise to coordination
amongst themselves or between them and the joint venture
(referred to as "concentrative joint ventures"). The latter are
concentrations and as such are caught by the Regulation.
Cooperative joint ventures fall to be considered under Articles 85
and 86 [of the Treaty of Rome].76
3. The Definition of Joint Venture
The Commission Notice reads: "J[oint] V[entures] are undertakings
that are jointly controlled by several other undertakings, the parent
companies."' The key characteristics are set out in terms of positive and
negative effects on economic markets. The positive condition is recog-
nized as being the "joint venture performing on a lasting basis all functions
of an autonomous economic entity.""8 The negative condition is the
"absence of coordination of competitive behaviour."" The beneficial
economic outcomes fostered by the former condition may be outweighed
by the adverse anti-competitive circumstances spawned by the latter.'
It is the negative condition that draws strict scrutiny from the Commis-
sion.8 '
4. The Future of Joint Ventures in the EC
The Commission is empowered to grant exceptions pursuant to article
85(3) of the Treaty of Rome, 2 or, when joint ventures are deemed
76. Commission Notice, supra note 5, at C 203/10. See De Smedt & Vandersanden,
supra note 73, at 442. The authors explain that:
When the only purpose of the operation is to coordinate the competitive
behavior of independent companies, it will not be considered a concentration.
However, an agreement to coordinate behavior might fall under Article 85 and
thus infringe EC competition law. A joint venture permanently functioning as
an autonomous economic entity will be treated as a concentration unless its
purpose is to coordinate the competitive behavior between the companies.
kd
77. De Smedt & Vandersanden, supra note 73, at 442.
78. Commission Notice, supra note 5, at C 203/11.
79. Id. at 12.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See supra text accompanying note 32.
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concentrative, to accept modifications from the undertakings involved.83
Further, the Commission may declare the joint venture incompatible with
the EC4 and order divestiture of the assets, cessation of joint control, or
"any other action that may be appropriate in order to restore conditions of
effective competition."' Preventing distortion of competition in the
Common Market is the Commission's main objective."
In a judgment on a joint venture among three European packaging
companies, the Commission decided that if a joint venture did not interfere
with competition, then any other implementing agreements among the
companies were also permissible." Thus, companies announcing joint
ventures probably will not need to notify the Commission of all peripheral
arrangements," which could include special cooperation agreements on
research and development and licensing deals. 9 The Commission
apparently defers to joint venture arrangements that promise positive
economic benefits for the EC. The Commission seems more concerned
with ensuring that competition is not damaged, rather than actually
83. Regulation, supra note 3, Art. 8(2), at L 395/6; Elland, supra note 2, at 115.
Recently, the EC Commission tentatively cleared a joint venture between Proctor &
Gamble Company of the United States and Italy's Final S.P.A., after both agreed to change
the terms of their venture plan in order to ensure competition in the diaper-making
business. Europe Venture by P. & G. Cleared, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 19, 1991, at 37; The
Free-Market Enforcer Who's Shaking Up Europe, BusiNEss WEEK, Nov. 4, 1991, at 50
[hereinafter Free Market Enforcer].
84. Regulation, supra note 3, Art. 8(3), at L 395/6; Elland, supra note 2, at 115.
85. Regulation, supra note 3, Art. 8(4), at L 395/6; Elland, supra note 2, at 115.
86. Elland, supra note 2, at 118.
87. Elopak/Metal Box, 1990 0. J. (L209) 15. See Kellaway, supra note 57, at 2. This
packaging sector joint venture case involved Elopak, Metal Box, and newly created
"ODIN." Elopak/Metal Box, supra. The co-venturers joined forces to develop and exploit
a new container. Id. Their agreements also covered the machinery and technology for
filling such containers. Id The parent companies sought an exemption pursuant to article
85 of the Treaty of Rome. Id. The Commission decided that these agreements, involving
restrictions, were necessary for setting up and efficiently operating the joint venture and
were as such compatible with the rules of competition. Elopak/Metel Box, supra. In this
case, the co-venturers granted nonexclusive licenses to the joint venture allowing it to
exploit their respective intellectual property rights and do its job. Id. ODIN has an
exclusive right, within the field of the agreement, to exploit these rights and any
improvements it may make. Id.
88. Elopak/Metal Box, supra note 87.
89. Id.
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promoting competition." Deregulation, increased freedom, and individual
responsibility to individual enterprises appear to mark the trend.9
Only in the most blatant instances involving concentrative joint
ventures will the Commission hold economically valuable undertakings to
the strict scrutiny of the new Regulation.' Exemptions likely will be
meted out pursuant to article 85(3) of the Treaty of Rome, especially when
the parent companies are noncompetitors.93 When they are competitors,
the old question applies: Just how anti-competitive is the arrangement, and
do the economic benefits outweigh the anti-competitive risks?9'
Clearly, the Commission has exclusive authority to apply the new
Regulation." Furthermore, the Regulation evidently does not deal with
90. ABA Sections Annual Spring Meeting Probes Consequences of EC Integration, 56
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1414, at 688 (1990).
91. Id. The pan-European initiative to create a single European market became
effective in 1992.
92. Highlights, 59 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1477, at 165 (1990).
93. See supra text accompanying note 87; see Ancillary Restrictions, supra note 57, at
189.
94. EEC, supra note 36, at 979.
95. Regulation, supra note 3, at 3. Furthermore,
[plower to enforce the Merger Regulation is vested in the Commission of the
European Community, the decision making body within the EC's permanent
bureaucracy. A Merger Task Force has been set up within the Commission's
Directorate Generale for Competition (DG IV) to administer the pre-merger
notification program and to conduct antitrust reviews of transactions under a
new substantive standard established by the Merger Regulation. Commission
decisions are subject to judicial review by the European Court of Justice, the
judicial arm of the EC.
Michael H. Byowitz, The European Community's Merger Regulation, N.Y. L.J., December
13, 1990, at 5.
It has been noted that the "[elstablishment of a single authority controlling
'concentrations' was a central condition for the British government's agreement to the
Regulation last December." Misplaced Doubts on EC Mergers, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1990,
at 34 [hereinafter Misplaced Doubts].
The Commission may decide that a case is better dealt with on the national level.
Id. See UK to Investigate Allied, Carlsberg Merger, REUTERS, Mar. 10, 1992. Concerns
that might prompt such a determination may be the public interest that a member state may
wish to pursue on non-competition grounds or that a proposed joint venture may be so
concentrated in a single geographic market as to make referral to national authorities
appropriate. EC Commission Grants U.K Referral for First Tme Under Merger Rule,
BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Feb. 27, 1992, at 1.
Public interest concerns might include public security, plurality of the media, and
prudential rules for the financial service industries. Misplaced Doubts, supra; see De
Smedt & Vandersanden, supra note 73, at 445 (The authors point out that "[t]he
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joint ventures whose goal or effect is the coordination of the competitive
activities of the parent companies and the venture, which remain indepen-
dent of each other (cooperative joint ventures).' Therefore, the direct,
actual, or potential effects of the establishment and operation of the joint
venture on the market relationships involved have determinative impor-
tance." This is the case because the dividing line between concordance
of interests in a joint venture and a coordination of competitive behavior
that is incompatible with the notion of concentration cannot be laid down
for every conceivable type of case." Technological and economic
progress is encouraged," but the preservation of competition is of
paramount importance."°
Several commentators foresee that the new Regulation will cause as
many problems as it seeks to solve.' Nevertheless, cooperative joint
ventures will probably continue to be dealt with under articles 85 and 86
of the Treaty of Rome,' °2 while concentrative joint ventures, as defined
by the criteria laid out in the new Regulation and Commission Notice, will
be handled under article 3(2) of the new Regulation.0 3 This outcome is
instructive because it suggests that a more focused inquiry on anti-
competitive effects will be undertaken by the Commission.
On the day the Regulation was to take effect, one commentator noted
that "[t]he new arrangements are intended to give the European Commis-
sion sole jurisdiction on mergers which have an important European
Regulation expressly gives the ECJ (European Court of Justice) the right to review all
commission decisions under Article 21(1)."). Furthermore, they note that "Itihe Regulation
clearly grants the Commission exclusive jurisdiction over mergers or acquisitions having
a Community dimension [under] Article 21(2)." Id. at 446.
96. Commission Notice, supra note 5, at (C 203) 10.
97. Id. at (C 203) 12.
98. Id.
99. Fine, supra note 3, at 50.
100. See DTI Press Release 90/17, Jan. 15, 1990, at 1 (The development of technologi-
cal and economic progress was qualified, at the insistence of the United Kingdom, to
include a condition that competition be preserved.). See supra text accompanying note 10.
101. Elland, supra note 2, at 118; Fine, supra note 3, at 50. Andreas Weitbrecht
contends that the substantive test is not purely one of competition law, asserting that "jobs,
integration, and Europe's world-competitiveness... remain on the hidden agenda." ABA
Section Probes Developments, supra note 34, at 910.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 32,40; see ABA Section Probes Developments,
supra note 34, at 910.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 4, 29; see ABA Section Probes Developments,
supra note 34, at 910.
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dimension .... [It] now has the power to block mergers which it decides
will prevent or hinder competition .... [Ilts rulings will be governed
solely by whether the merger reduces competition . . . ."0 This
observation, although seeming to focus on mergers, is enlightening with
respect to joint ventures. Those joint ventures that are deemed concentra-
tive will be subject to the same scrutiny under the Regulation as mergers
under article 3(2). "6
Joint ventures that qualify as concentrations and have a community
dimension will require a notification directed to the Commission."°
After notification, the Commission will decide whether the venture is EC-
compatible by considering whether it "creates or strengthens a dominant
position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly
impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it."' °7
104. The Merger Minefield, THE TIMES (London), Sept. 21, 1990, at 1.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 4, 29.
106. Regulation, supra note 3, article 1(1), at L 395/3; Byowitz, supra note 95, at 5.
Article 1(1) reads: "Without prejudice to Article 22 this Regulation shall apply to
all concentrations with a Community dimension as defined in paragraph 2." Regulation,
supra note 3, article 1(1), at L 395/3.
Community dimension determinations are based upon the size thresholds set out in
article 1(2) as applied to the coventures. Regulation, supra note 3, article 1(2). Article
1(2) reads:
For the purposes of this Regulation, a concentration has a Community
dimension where;
(a) the aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is
more than ECU 5,000 million, and
(b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of at least two of the
undertakings concerned is more than ECU 250 million, unless each of the
undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate
Community-wide turnover within one and the same member state.
If the joint venture satisfies these quantitative thresholds, it falls under the Regulation.
ABA Section Probes Developments, supra note 34, at 910.
107. Regulation, supra note 3, at L395/4. Presently, the Commission is in the process
of revamping the rules that govern joint ventures in the EC in an attempt to "plug a gap"
in the Regulation. See Good News for EC Joint Ventures, INvEmENT DEALER'S DIGEST,
Feb. 10, 1992, at 17; EC Easing Joint Venture Rules; Aim is to Spur Cooperation in
Research and Marketing, INT'L HERALD TR., Jan. 20, 1992, at I (mentioning that the
draft guidelines have been distributed to national experts and lawyers for comment before
they are finalized) [hereinafter EC Easing Joint Venture Rules].
Formally the Draft Guidelines on Cooperative Joint Ventures Under European
Community Competition Law, these rules are basically a statement of existing policy and
an attempt to remedy, in part, what the Commission sees as discriminatory regulatory
treatment of cooperative joint ventures relative to concentrative joint ventures. Draft Joint
Venture Guidelines Would Codify Existing EC Case Law, BNA INT'L Bus. DAILY, Feb.
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IV. CONCLUSION
It is extremely plausible that an anti-competitive joint venture
situation, which might otherwise have been unacceptable, will be allowed
to go ahead because of the positive economic or social benefits it promises.
The measure of exclusive jurisdiction that the Commission enjoys'(* may
27, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Draft Joint Venture Guidelines].
According to the draft guidelines, '[clertain cooperative joint ventures-those
performing all the functions of a normal firm-usually help to increase competition and
therefore deserve favorable treatment." EC Easing Joint Venture Rules, supra.
The discussion paper circulated along with the draft guidelines notes that cooperative
joint ventures can take up to two years to process, while concentrative joint ventures
covered by the Regulation are usually processed by the Commission in one month and take
no more than five months for a final conclusion. Draft Joint Venture Guidelines, supra
The draft guidelines would allow "almost automatic eligibility for exemption" from EC
competition law for cooperative joint ventures in which production and marketing activities
fall below certain market share levels. EC Easing Joint Venture Rules, supra
Under the draft guidelines, officials must determine whether a joint venture will
restrict competition between the parent companies based on an evaluation of whether they
can "reasonably be expected to enter the market individually." Id They would also have
to undertake an examination of the joint venture's effect on third parties, "including
competing companies and the market's traditional suppliers and customers." Id
An attorney in Brussels pointed out that the hottest issue for many practitioners is not
how the guidelines will work, but rather what will be considered a concentrative joint
venture covered by the Regulation and which deals will fall outside its scope and under
the guidelines. Draft Joint Venture Guidelines, supra. Recent Commission decisions
indicate that its interpretation of the scope of the Regulation's applicability to joint
ventures is fairly broad, the lawyer observed. Id
A leading expert in the field, Barry E. Hawk, suggested that the Commission should
promulgate "a clear jurisdiction test for the kinds of transactions that fall within the
[Regulation] and get rid of this [cooperative/concentrative] distinction." Id
108. De Smedt & Vandersanden, supra note 73, at 450-51. This article expresses the
notion of the "one stop shop," namely that the Regulation requires only that the
Commission in Brussels be satisfied, on competitive grounds, that a proposed undertaking
should proceed. Id
The authors conclude that "[d]epending upon the attitude of the authorities of member
states, the Regulation will either severely hinder the creation of large pan-European
companies by creating additional roadblocks, or will assist it by creating the desired 'one
stop shop.'" Id at 450-51. One antitrust expert from the United States has suggested that
the "one stop shop" principle lacks integrity because the quantitative thresholds are so high
that "attorneys often must file in several Member States" that have an interest in the
arrangements. A&A Section Probe Developments, supra note 34, at 911. This specialist
does, however, offer strong support for the pragmatism of the DGIV "in cutting back on
the scope of what has to be submitted." Id
There is a similarity between the treatment of concentrative joint ventures and
mergers under the Regulation. See ABA Section Probes Developments, supra note 34, at
910. Therefore, the foregoing analysis should apply in the joint venture context as well.
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help to encourage the creation of joint ventures that are somewhat anti-
competitive but offer economic benefits to the EC as a whole.1°9 In the
final analysis, it will be up to the Commission to come to terms with the
way in which joint ventures will be regulated under the present laws. The
application of the Treaty of Rome and the Regulation to cooperative and
concentrative joint ventures, respectively, will serve to define the scope and
parameters of this emerging facet in EC competition law
Thomas James Hall
109. In late 1991, a $47 million ECU package of subsidies to a joint venture by Ford
and Volkswagen to produce multipurpose vehicles in Setubal, Portugal, was approved
despite last minute lobbying by a French producer, Matra. EEC Competition Policy:
Controversial Aid to For4/Volkswagen Multi-Purpose Vehicle Plant Given Go Ahead,
MULTINATIONAL SERVICE, Aug./Sept. 1991, § 3, at 4 [hereinafter EEC Competition Policy:
Ford/Volkswagen]. Free-Market Enforcer, supra note 83, at 50.
The Commission apparently decided that the joint venture would not cause a serious
distortion of competition. EEC Competition Policy: FordVolkswagen, supra. It said the
aid package was justified because the project was in one of the community's poorest
regions. Il Further, the Commission stated that the Sebubal project will have a major
economic impact on Portugal's economy by creating jobs and allowing it to improve its
position in the vehicle and motor component sectors. Id Finally, according to the
Commission, Portuguese production should easily be swallowed up in a rapidly expanding
market. Id
A little more than a month later, the Commission rejected the sale of Boeing
Company's de Havilland aircraft unit to a joint venture by Italy's Alenia S.P.A. and
Aerospatiule S.A. of France. Europe Rejects Bid to Buy Boeing's Computer Unit, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1991, at D2.
Sir Leon Brittan said that the combination "would have [had] an unacceptable impact
on customers and the balance of competition in the European Community Market." Id
This Commission's decision marked the first time it had blocked a deal under the
new Regulation. Id However, in the first month of 1992, the Commission approved two
major "concentrative" joint-venture agreements.
The DGIV sanctioned the 50/50 joint venture between Italy's Snia Fibre and
Courtaulds Plc of the United Kingdom for the production of acetate fibers. EC Approves
Snia/Courtaulds Acetate Fibers Joint Venture, 11 INT'L PETROCHEMICAL REP. 6 (January
2, 1992). The new company, Novaceta Ltd., is based in Coventry, England and began
operating during the first week of the new year. Id
On January 17, 1992, the Commission announced that it would not oppose the
proposed joint venture in space activities by Saab-Scania Combitech AB of Linkoeping and
Ericsson Radar Electronics AB of Moelendal, both in Sweden. EC Executive Body Oks
Joint Venture, DEFENSE NEws, January 27, 1992, at 41. The new venture is called Saab
Ericsson Space AB. Id The Commission found that the new company will "have only
a relatively low market share in Europe" for its products, according to a January 17, 1992,
Commission press release. Id. Furthermore, the Commission said that the products of the
two parent firms in the space equipment field are "complementary," so there is no adverse
affect on competition. EC Clears Saab-Ericsson Space Joint Venture, 161 AEROsPACE
DAILY, Jan. 21, 1992, at 105.
